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Kihlbom has recently argued that a system of seeking negatively informed 
consent might be preferable in some cases to the ubiquitous informed 
consent model. Although this theory is perhaps not powerful enough to 
supplant informed consent in most settings, it lends strength to Evans’ and 
Hungin’s proposal that it can be ethical to prescribe placebos rather than 
‘active’ drugs. This paper presents an argument for using negatively informed 






It has been shown that placebos are as effective as or more effective than 
expensive drugs in some situations. However, use of placebos outwith clinical 
trials is widely regarded as unethical given the current emphasis on informed 
consent (IC) and patient autonomy. Conflicts between the four principles of 
biomedical ethics are apparent here: if providing placebo is more clinically 
effective and more cost effective than an active medicine, the principles of 
beneficence and justice, respectively, demand that the placebo is used. But 
can these two principles trump the generally dominant one of autonomy? 
 
This paper suggests that, under the recently proposed system of negatively 
informed consent (NIC),[1] where a patient abdicates access to information to 
some extent, the perfect conditions exist in which placebo use is rendered 
ethical in the normal healthcare context: among the information that can be 
legitimately withheld is that the prescribed medicine is not chemically active. 
(This also avoids the largely uncommented possibility that information 
overload might actually cause a nocebo effect in patients who obsess about 
potential risk.) NIC, in allowing patients to choose to circumscribe their own 




Negatively informed consent and placebo equivalence 
 
 
Kihlbom argues, contrary to the widespread view that patients should be given 
as much information as possible in order to maximise their autonomy, that “a 
relaxation of the requirement of IC would in some situations be a way to 
strengthen or at least to protect the autonomy of the patient”.[1] He outlines a 
system whereby the patient is competent and capable of understanding the 
treatment, but is not informed about the “method and means” or “all the 
significant difficulties and risks that are likely to occur.” Instead, they are told 
the purpose of the treatment, and that they can receive more information if 
they want to. Given these basic facts, the patient then “gives his/her voluntary 
and explicit consent to undergo the treatment and express[es] his/her 
voluntary and explicit wish not to have more information”.[1] Given the central 
relevance of Kihlbom’s argument to this paper, it is important to quote it 
directly. He argues that the nexessary conditions are that the patient: 
 
a. is competent, and 
b. has the capability of understanding the information 
c. has received information of: 
  – 1 Purpose of the treatment 
  – 2 That it is possible to receive more information if wanted 
  – 2 [sic] That the treatment is voluntary 
  – 3 That the consent can be withdrawn at any time 
d. has well founded beliefs that the physician will choose the 
treatment that best promote his/her values 
e. has well founded beliefs that the physician will choose the 
treatment, the risks of which are in accordance with his/her attitudes 
towards different kinds of risks. 
f. on the basis of this gives his/her voluntary and explicit consent to 
undergo the treatment and express his/her voluntary and explicit wish 
not to have more information [1] 
 
  Although Kihlbom’s approach is innovative, it is unclear whether it would 
work as a wholesale replacement for IC. As he himself states, criteria (d) and 
(e) seem to require particularly skilled physicians.[1] Indeed, it might be 
argued that only a telepathic doctor and a very trusting patient could make 
negatively informed consent work in most contexts. In drafting their 
forthcoming new guidance on consent, the General Medical Council 
considered and rejected a similar model to negatively informed consent.[2] 
Kihlbom concedes that “long-term treatments involving close doctor-patient 
relationships” are most suitable for NIC.[1] But we shall see that NIC is 
actually appropriate for some cases involving placebos where this relationship 
is not close. 
 
Evans and Hungin describe a situation where a doctor is discussing with a 
patient whether to prescribe him “SAS”, a fictional drug, or a placebo (itself a 
fictional drug in a different sense).[3] In a large trial of SAS, 35% of people 
found it relieved irritable bowel symptoms. However, 35% of people also 
experienced relief when given placebo. Of course, those people didn’t know it 
was a placebo, and this patient does, so that effect is lost; however, he also 
knows that SAS is no better than placebo, so there is a concomitant nocebo 
effect that might reduce the efficacy of the drug. As Evans and Hungin put it: 
“in prescribing either an ‘official’ placebo or SAS, Dr Jones would ordinarily 
expect even the limited (35%) hope of success to rest on her concealing from 
Smith some of the pertinent facts. Were she ethically unhappy about this 
concealment – and she is deeply unhappy – then she is to that extent 
inhibited from prescribing either.”[3] This is quite correct: if she gives him the 
drug and doesn’t tell him it’s not better than placebo, she’s withholding 
information; and if she gives him the placebo and doesn’t tell him it’s not the 
drug, she is doing the same.  
 
   
Negatively informed consent to use of placebos  
 
This is where negatively informed consent can be very useful. Dr Jones faces 
this ethical problem because of the requirements of informed consent: under 
the current regime of respecting autonomy via full disclosure of information, 
she has no choice but to say whether the placebo is a placebo or whether the 
drug is no better than placebo. But if we adopt Kihlbom’s system of NIC, we 
are perfectly able to obtain consent without incurring either a nocebo effect or 
a loss of placebo effect.  
 
 Dr Jones could simply inform her patient that she is going to give him a pill 
that will hopefully make him feel better. This is all that NIC requires, and 
works whether she prescribes the placebo or SAS (but we can assume that 
she goes for the placebo to save money and avoid side-effects). The patient 
simply doesn’t need to know whether it is an ‘active’ drug or a placebo; he 
knows the purpose of the treatment and that he can withdraw consent at any 
time. He also believes that his doctor will choose the treatment that best 
promotes his values and is most appropriate to his attitudes to risk. The only 
possible problem is if he wants more information about the treatment, which 
might well negate the placebo effect; this is discussed in the next section. 
 
What if the patient wants more information than simply knowing that the 
doctor is giving them a pill that will hopefully make them feel better? 
Licthenberg and colleagues have offered a more specific formulation of how a 
doctor could phrase an offer of placebo prescription: “I would like to offer you 
a pill which I believe can help lessen your suffering. I do not know exactly how 
it works. I have other pills to offer whose mechanism is clearer, but I am not 
sure that they will work better for you, and they may also entail more serious 
side effects.”[4] This is potentially compatible with NIC, although this phrasing 
avoids mentioning information at all.  A more ethically rigorous approach 
might be to say something like: “This pill has no side-effects, but studies have 
shown that the more I tell you about how it works, the less effective it will be.” 
Although this runs the risk of having the patient realise the pill in question is a 
placebo, it is more honest than the formulation suggested by Lichtenberg et 
al, and fits more closely with Kihlbom’s requirements. This approach would 
allow patients who are not satisfied with the simpler formulation above to 
make a specific choice between having more information and having the 
greatest clinical benefit. 
 
 Although he doesn’t mention placebos, Kihlbom provides a persuasive 
example that supports my argument here: 
 
  …suppose that I have a severe headache and take a couple of 
painkillers to get rid of it. To have sufficient understanding for acting 
autonomously, I surely need to have good grounds for believing the 
pills will relieve me of my headache. It seems also reasonable that I 
also should have well-founded negative beliefs about [sic] that taking 
them will not bring with them significant risks for side-effects. 
However, I need no positive beliefs of how they chemically work in 
my brain, to have sufficient knowledge for making an autonomous 
decision. [1] 
 
This passage implies that a positive belief that the pills work chemically in 
the brain is necessary, althought Kihlbom’s central account does not 
require this. My argument is that the patient needs no positive belief 
whether a particular drug will chemically work at all: that it relieves 
symptoms is the important point. NIC is perfect for situations such as this 
where normal IC would negate placebo effect or cause nocebo effect; 
using IC would result in a worse clinical outcome. Further support for this 
idea comes from Frances Kapp, who suggested a system similar to 
Kihlbom’s: “Under the incomplete disclosure model presented here, an 
individual patient could contract with his or her personal physician so that 
the physician would be permitted to withhold from the patient some 
antitherapeutic information.”[5] Along similar lines, Howard Spiro has 
suggested that “a patient has the right to waive his right to all information”, 
although this sounds like a step too far.[6] 
 
 Of course, the case we have been looking at involves a convenient 
equality of efficacy between placebo and drug. But NIC would also 
legitimise placebo use in other circumstances. Imagine a case where the 
active drug relieves symptoms in 50% of patients but also has serious 
side-effects in 50% of those upon whom it is effective. This would mean 
that only 25% of patients would benefit without the side effects. Now 
imagine that placebo relieved symptoms in 35% of patients without side-
effects.  Would it not serve the patient’s interests better to prescribe the 
placebo rather than the drug? Kihlbom’s criterion (e) states that the 
physician will choose the treatment the risks of which are in accordance 
with the patient’s attitudes towards risks. Prescribing the placebo in this 
case would completely avoid the risk of side-effects, while only slightly 
reducing the risk that the treatment will not work. This would very possibly 
be compatible with a particular patient’s priorities; if asked to choose 
between two pills, one of which works without side effects in over a third of 
patients, and one of which works without side-effects in only a quarter, 
some patients would certainly choose the former. Using NIC solely for 
placebo prescription actually solves the potential ethical problem posed by 
withholding information about risks: if placebos are being prescribed, there 
won’t be any side-effects, so the obligation to disclose them evaporates. 
Furthermore, the benefits are twofold for risk-averse patients: they can 
choose a treatment (placebo) with no side-effects over an active treatment 
whose potential side-effects might cause them to worry so much that the 
active effect of the drug would be diminished. 
 
Assuming that we accept the basic ethical soundness of NIC, there would 
be many situations where placebos might be preferable to active drugs, 
and not only in the treatment of functional illnesses: “for some chronic, 
distressing, fully evaluated, and relatively harmless conditions such as 
common colds, insomnia, phobias, most cases of premature ejaculation, 
and some pain or mood disorders a trial of placebo therapy my well be 
indicated.”[7] What if an active drug works in only 30% of patients? What if 
it works in 40% but with serious side effects? What if it works in 35% but 
costs 100 times what a placebo would? And in addition to the avoidance 
of side-effects, placebos are much cheaper than most active drugs, and 
could reduce the strain on the NHS of funding the delivery of new 
pharmaceutical discoveries. Furthermore, it is possible that the placebo 
effect obtained by prescribing via NIC would be greater in the clinical 
context than in drug trials: in research, “informed consent ensures that 
participants are aware they might receive a placebo or a drug that might 
not be effective. It is likely that this will reduce the placebo effect.”[7] If a 
patient provides NIC for  a placebo pill that their doctor believes will help 





A first objection is that Evans’ and Hungins’ example is unrealistic inasmuch 
as SAS would not have been licensed for clinical use if it were no better than 
placebo. The first response to this is that doctors do sometimes prescribe 
unlicensed drugs. But more importantly, such a drug might in fact be licensed, 
because an active drug that is equivalent to placebo can nonetheless be 
ethically prescribed to patients under the current system, while placebos 
cannot. (There is also the separate issue of whether “no better than placebo” 
is really a description that merits the disdain it currently attracts.) 
 
Another objection is that it would simply be unethical to prescribe a placebo 
rather than an active drug that would actually attack underlying causes of 
disease. However, I am limiting my argument to the treatment of functional 
illnesses without identifiable causes, as Evans and Hungin did in their original 
paper. Given that placebos “relieve some symptoms in approximately 35% of 
patients who suffer from conditions such as angina pectoris, cough, anxiety, 
depression, hypertension, headache, and the common cold”,[8] this does not 
circumscribe the appeal of NIC for placebos too much. As already stated, 
however, there may well be some situations where placebos are also 
preferable to pharmacologically active drugs for treatment of non-functional 
illnesses because of cost or side-effect considerations. 
 
Perhaps a more serious objection to my argument is that negatively informed 
consent does not sufficiently respect the patient’s autonomy. But Kihlbom 
makes it clear that autonomy is at the centre of his account, and it is difficult to 
see how it would be more respectful of a patients’ autonomy to cause a 
nocebo or loss of placebo effect simply in order to fully inform them. Another 
way of putting it is that we can only assume consent to nondisclosure of such 
therapeutically sensitive facts: if doctors insist on always fully disclosing 
information on whether drugs are active to patients, they rob themselves of 
the best therapeutic option and might well find that the patient is annoyed at 
this. In fact, an insistence on fully informing the patient could itself violate a 
patient’s autonomy by denying them the most beneficial options. Under the 
current system, the patient can choose any option except to remain slightly 
underinformed. Of course, if a patient who has intitally consented under NIC 
does request information, then it would have to be disclosed regardless of any 
therapeutic detriment, in accordance with Kihlbom’s criterion c2. 
 
Beauchamp and Childress state that “the therapeutic use of placebos typically 
involves intentional deception or incomplete disclosure.”[8] But using NIC 
instead of IC avoids this deception by having the patient agree to incomplete 
disclosure: the doctor is saying something like “the prescriptions that are 
options for your condition require a certain ignorance of how they work. I 
could tell you more about them, but then they’d be less likely to be effective.” 
At this point, if the patient refuses to provide NIC, the doctor would seek IC 
instead, and thus compromise clinical benefit only at the patient’s request, 
rather than automatically, as is the case with IC in the particular situation we 
have been looking at. Thus NIC maximises therapeutic potential while 
continuing to respect patients’ autonomy. In a sense, it maximises autonomy 
beyond the normal threshold by allowing access to a wider range of 
treatments. With Kihlbom’s safeguards in place, there is no reason why NIC 
cannot permit ethical presecription of placebos. 
 
 A final objection is raised by Howard Brody, who argues that “unless the 
patient is billed for an amount commensurate with the cost of active drugs, the 
deception will not succeed.”[9] This could indeed be a problem for my 
argument in some contexts, although there might be ways around it. Within 
the context of the NHS, however, this is not an issue: patients are charged for 
the prescription rather than the drug itself, so a placebo and an active drug 





The unconsented-to placebo is the classic example of utility trumping consent: 
if the patient is told it is a placebo, it will probably not work, negating clinical 
utility. Furthermore, if a ‘real’ drug is prescribed instead, it might cost the NHS 
more, meaning that utility will be compromised in this sense too. I have 
presented an argument that NIC can render the use of placebos ethical while 
respecting patients’ autonomy. Using NIC to prescribe placebos increases the 
range of possible benefits to patients, and should not be dismissed simply 
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